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Following the Conservative Party’s victory in the UK general election, David Cameron has pledged
to renegotiate the country’s EU membership and put this deal to the British electorate as an ‘in/out’
referendum. Michael Emerson assesses some of the potential demands the UK government might
make in a renegotiation. He writes that it is doubtful whether the concessions that could be gained
at the EU level would be enough to satisfy Cameron’s party.
So David Cameron confounded the polls and won a thin but absolute majority in the House of
Commons, while all his adversaries in England were shattered, as witnessed by the immediate
resignation of the leaders of Labour (Ed Miliband), the Liberal Democrats (Nick Clegg) and even UKIP (Nigel
Farage). But Nicola Sturgeon and the Scottish nationalists also triumphed, sweeping up 56 out of the 59 Scottish
constituencies.
The ﬁrst consequence for the EU will surely be that
Cameron will announce legislation to ﬁx the date for
the in-or-out referendum scheduled for 2017, with
some discussion of whether it could be brought
forward into 2016. This will be the easy part. Much
more tricky will be the second step: to set out what
Cameron actually wants, going beyond the vague
rhetoric about “renegotiating a new settlement or
better deal for the UK within a reformed EU” that he
has relied on so far.
The UK’s potential demands
Cameron’s demands to the EU institutions and other
member states will most likely fall under the three key
words he has been using: repatriation, renegotiation
and reform. Repatriation in any strategic sense
means deleting competences from the Lisbon Treaty
for all member states. But Cameron’s own Balance of
Competence Review went into this question thoroughly, and found no instance where there was a sound case for
repatriation.
At the level of secondary legislation, unnecessary or obsolete regulations and directives (“red tape”) could be
weeded out, precisely what Frans Timmermans, ﬁrst vice-president of the European Commission, is now mandated
to do. Cameron can certainly champion this appointment as something he has always wanted – and if he wants to
call Timmermans’ recommendations repatriation, so be it.
Renegotiation means changing the speciﬁc terms of the UK’s membership. Here, Cameron’s scope is limited by
three factors:
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to more rather than less EU action, and above all to have all EU law for the single market applied by all
member states.
The UK’s existing opt-outs are already huge – the euro, Schengen, justice and home aﬀairs – and there is
nothing about them to be renegotiated.
Decisions in major domains such as foreign and security policy and taxation demand unanimous votes in the
EU Council, so nothing can be passed there without the UK’s agreement. This is the biggest reason why
Cameron’s renegotiation talk has rung so hollow.
But aside from these, there are two conspicuous UK complaints outstanding: immigration from the EU and some
labour market regulations, for example the working time directive, which establishes minimum standards. On
immigration, Cameron’s ﬁrst line of action can be to exploit the recent Dano ruling of the European Court of Justice of
November 2014, which conﬁrms national powers to decide the criteria for residence by “other” EU nationals, which
in turn controls access to many social welfare beneﬁts and so-called “beneﬁt tourism”.
The UK can recalibrate these criteria on its own responsibility, without requiring any renegotiation. However several
other of the richer member states have similar concerns over “beneﬁt tourism”. Even if the evidence for this
phenomenon is quite weak, there might be some new secondary EU legislation in this area forthcoming. On the
working time directive, maybe some speciﬁc UK opt-out from some provisions, such as for hospital workers, could
be agreed.
On reform or policy improvement, by contrast, there’s a very substantial agenda, in many instances corresponding
well with what the UK has been driving at. Cameron wants “a reformed EU”, and could claim success in building up a
critical mass or momentum for change in areas such as ﬁnancial services in particular, energy and climate, and the
digital sector. He could also point to recent reform achievements in agriculture and ﬁsheries, and in achieving some
cuts in the EU budget for the multi-annual period until 2020. Looking ahead the EU is engaged in many trade
opening negotiations, including with the US, India and Japan, which corresponds to a key UK priority.
Would this ﬂy?
Many member states are adamantly against the idea of treaty change these days for any purpose, let alone just for
the UK. The above package could be broadly acceptable to Brussels and other member states without treaty
change. But would this ﬂy at home for Cameron? The above agenda is certainly short of what many Tory MPs say
they want.
Without the restraining presence of the Liberal Democrats in coalition, the all-Conservative government might be
tempted to switch into making far more radical demands, such as abolishing EU powers and returning them to the
national level, which would require treaty change. Of course, various europhobic Tory MPs would approve of a
radical agenda that was sure to fail and thus lead to a no vote in the referendum.
How strong will the temptation to give in be? This is where the new Scottish reality comes into play. SNP leader
Nicola Sturgeon has so far said quite clearly that she would not favour returning to the independence question with a
new referendum except in materially new circumstances, or a “new situation”.
That clearly extends to a hypothetical “Brexit”. If Cameron’s negotiations with the EU started going badly wrong, this
hypothesis would liven up – and he would then be facing his ultimate nightmare scenario, simultaneously presiding
over the secession of the UK from the EU and of Scotland from the UK.
Cameron could, however, become a leading proponent of a more eﬀective European foreign, security and defence
policy. That would perfectly complement the UK’s role in pushing a progressive agenda in the single market and
external trade domains. On foreign policy, Cameron’s ﬁrst government has done the reverse on a most alarming
scale: there used to be a “big three” in EU foreign policy, but now there is only a “big two” – France and Germany,
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who took the lead on Europe’s response to the Ukraine crisis.
There is still room for a fresh initiative to contribute in a very signiﬁcant way to the enhancement of the EU’s foreign,
security and defence policy. If Cameron wants to include some things that would require the active support and
goodwill of his partners in his agenda for a new settlement with the EU, it might be a good place to start.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article was originally published at The Conversation. Read the original article. It gives the views of
the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1K1OkW6
 _________________________________
About the author
Michael Emerson
Michael Emerson is Associate Senior Research Fellow at The Centre for European Policy Studies.
3/3
